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processes, which could be described as mechanical functions.
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The reasons for use of cost-benefit analysis in public policy
decision-making are discussed. A private, profit-oriented firm seeks to
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(specifically, the recognized lack thereof), e}:ploring the question of
conflict-of-interest with respect to the relationship between the
decision-maker and the analyst, considering the difficulty of satisfying
the full information requirement, touching the primary problem of
identifying objectives.
CRITICISMS
The relation of cost-benefit analysis to utilitarianism is
recognized. Several standard criticisms of utilitarianism are introduced
and rephrased for application to cost-benefit analysis. Nominally, these
include:
bias, identification of costs and benefits, measurability,
dish'ibution, minority rights, uncertainty, and time.
The discussion
serves additionally to augment the understanding of the process of
cost-benefit analysis.
In a second line of argumentation, the problem of government action
is explicated. Unintentional indirect (as •.11ell as intentional direct)
effects on the financial markets and the system of the economy resulting
from public policy decisions necessitate attention.
RESPONSE
The criticisms are addressed. The tenor of the response is less
that of rebuttal to the arguments and more in general support of the use
of the process of cost-benefit analysis.
CONCLUDING COMt1ENTS
Notes from unrelated fields are presented in defense of the
arguments about cost-benefit analysis, as well as additional unexpressed
questions. Cost-benefit analysis despite weaknesses appears to stand as a
valuable and necessary technique, with a place in public policy
decision-making.

INTRODUCTION

JLtst what

is to be understood by the term • cost-benefit anal!:Jsis"

("benefit-cost analysis")?

The question itself arises from a curiosit!:J into

how government decisions <which affect all) are made.

This paper gives an

elementary discusssion of constitutive parts, raising and responding to some
initial

criticisms.

It

~

explanation or elaboration.

fairly

evident,

The individual

on

unneedful
the street

of

additional

would simply

declare that it sounded 1 ike some rather ordinary decision-making process
which involved the consideration of the costs and benefits incurred by the
paths of action that might be selected.
anyone

and

not

the

exclusive

claim

of

"Ordinary" means accessible to
the

degreed

economists

or

the

governmental guardians; rather, a common-sense listing, accounting, of the
"pros and cons."

This hypothetical individual has grasped the core of the

matter, but the peripheral understanding is mistaken.

Cost-benefit analysis appears to have a history similar to those of
its siblings in economic phenomena: people knew it existed and engaged in it
previous

to

its

identification

and

description.

The

United

States

manifestation of "benefit-cost analysis" (as it is known on this side of the
At I antic (Campen:
<Campen: 16).

12)),

is traced to the River and Harbor Act of 1902

The Flood Control Act of 1936 is more often cited because of

its wording directing choices such that "the benefits to whomsoever they
accrue are in excess of estimated costs"(Campen:

16). The problem with this

high-intentioned phrasing was that an instruction sheet was not enclosed,
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leaving the agencies to figur•e out to the best of their abilities just what
was to

be understood by

behavior

on

the

part

the

of

terms.

the

What

agencies:

then

happened was reasonable

they

each

sought

self-interest, and "benefit-cost studies were intended
that

the agencies wanted

serious,

to undertake rather

critical analyses of

their

own

to justify projects

than

designed

the (project) merits"

<Campen:

to

provide

17).

This

approach, faults noted, will provide a basis for a criticism of cost-benefit
analysis to be discussed later.

The question remains.

The lay response given above is a solid first

step. The second steps are as varied in size and direction as are the views,
kinds,

manners,

cost-benefit

weights,

analysis.

situations,
Other

factors

intentions,
which

and

color

understood ••• " include political inclinations, motives,

applications
"what

is

to

of
be

and the effective

power of the utilizers.

A response drawing from the field of the social science of economics
<although not necessarily the response of an economist) is that it (costbenefit analysis) is applied welfare economics <Campen:
commences:

16J. The regression

what is to be understood by "welfare economics"? For starters,

the term "welfare" in this conte:{t is not what is contemporarily understood.
Rather,

it refers to the "spread" between what the consumer is wi 11 ing to

spend for a product and the actual price of that product.

A simple market

example of this is the student in desperate need of a writing implement so
as to take that mid-term, who is ardently willing to pay ten dollars for the
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article which is rung in the cash register at seventy-nine cents (plus tax).
The surplus enjoyed by the consumer,
quantified at $9.17.

the consumer's welfare,

is tidily

And there is a flag on the play-- the next statement

sounds suspiciously normative for a science -- the consumer is better off
than if the register had rung up the full sum determined by the consumer's
willingness.
consumers.

This
At

the

concept

is

societal

then
level,

extrapolated
the

to

situation

the

community

bears

only

of

slight

resemblance to the that of the "simple market" -- the evaluation, appraisal
of the action is in terms of who is to be made better or worse off by the
choice,

and by how much.

The society is the recipient of the costs and

benefits of the course of action, the whole and only reason for conducting
the analysis.

The Pandora's box opens and questions flood the lines as· the example
e:·:Plodes; that is, questions of welfare are globally present.
measure, which serves dually as offensive and defensive,

The first

is to establish

limiting parameters for discussion. The specific application of cost-benefit
analysis is that which might be described as the setting of an objective;
selecting a means, a course of action, with an eye to that objective; and
studying the effects of that course of action. In the realm of public policy
decision-making,

cost-benefit

analysis

is

a

technique

alternative courses of action, or even between A or not-A.

for

comparing
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EXPOSITION

The service of cost-benefit analysis is derived from its setting,
the economic system of the free marketplace.

As described first by Adam

Smith, the functioning of the ideal free marketplace would result in the
optimal economic benefit over all.

Srrlith posits that the individuals'

pursuit of their own self-interest results in the the maximization of the
interest of society as a whole.

The model of the ideal free market is

defined by a number of characteristic conditions in order that it might
work perfectly to achieve the best economic outcome.

A> In the market for each good, there are a large number of
relatively small buyers and sellers.
B> All firms in the same industry produce similar goods; •••
products are completely standardized among firms and
there is no brand loyalty among consumers.
C> Resources are completely mobile. Owners of productive
resources (land, labor, capital) are free to put them
to whatever use they please •.•. There are no barriers
to establishing a firm in any industry.
D>
Each economic agent is an optimizer. Each individual
acts to ma:dmize ••• satisfaction, each firm acts to
maximize its profits.
knows with
Each agent has perfect knowledge,
E>
certainty all present and future prices.
F> There are no price rigidities. Prices may move up or
down subject to market pressures. <Sassone: 56,58)
From

this

elementary

· · t 10n
·
de f 1n1

can

be

drawn

two

add1. t ional

descriptive statements:
Prices are determined by the market equilibration of supply and demand
in the long run, goods are produced and sold at the lowest possible price
<Sassone: 57)
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Given all of the above,

then,

the market would work perfectly,

requiring no intervention from without.

With participants as free and as

numerous as described, no one individual's action can change the whale.
The homogeneity of the product ensures that the demand curve (indicative
of consumer preference) is uniformly elastic.

"Perfect• is understood to

be the state of all the individuals pursuing their own self-interest and
being

equally

satisfied

in

that

pursuit,

thanks

to

the

concomitant

accomplishment of the best interest of the society which the individuals
comprise.
is not

It cannot be too obvious by this paint that such "perfection"

even

mostly appro:<imated,

intervention of an outside agency.

and

that

there

is a need for

the

The question at hand, however, is not

a criticism of the market system or a political statement supportive of
government involvement.

Rather, a decision is to be made of a course of

action. It is to be gained from the discussion immediately foregoing that
a decision in the marketplace will have effects, positive and negative,
which are

to

be understood

in

the cante:<t of

the marketplace.

To

make sense of the effects is the purpose of cost-benefit analysis.

THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS MACHINE

The imagery of a machine lends to one view held of cost-benefit
analysis as a "neutral machine" <Campen:

26). Simply speaking, a machine

would conduct cast-benefit analyses in the fallowing fashion:
1. A problem or case is rendered by the operator far consideration.
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2. The operator specifies the objectives of the study, determining what
is to be maximized.
3. The objectives are interpreted and contained in a function.
4. The function is then maximized "given the empirical relations in the
economy and the institutional constraints that may be appropriate.•
(Ibid.).
5. The results are then submitted to the operator as 'input'

for the

decision on the case or problem.

The

initial

difficulties in

step

needs

little

additional

e:·:plication.

its execution could be the defining of

The

the problem,

although the instance of considering between one course of action and
another seems fairly straightforward.

This step is before the threshhold

to the room housing the cost-benefit analysis machine is even crossed,
and is all in the hands of the operators.

In language of an example, in

the arena of public policy decision-making, this step is the legislators'
determining that either policy X or policy Y ought to be implemented to
deal with the problem of litter in the State Park system.

The second step is the presentation of the question to the machine.
The machine, one might say,

is sharp but ignorant.

Submemory A would

receive, as the operators intend, the values or variables which are to be
maximized (or minimized).

Submernory B would receive, as the operators

best understand, a description of that in respect to which the costs and
benefits are to be analyzed.

For subrnemory C, all of the details of the
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relevant situations would have to be spelled out as e:·:pl ici tly as the
operators themselves know.

Continuing with the e:{ample above,

A might
In B

contain the objectives of conservation and least cost operation.
would be the description of the two policies.

The data of C would be all

manner of general and specific information about the State Park system,
its concerns,

its business,

as well as

information about

the State's

economy avera 11 •

The third step introduces the "magic."

With the proper amount of

mathematical wizadry,

the software of the machine crunches and chugs on

the

was entered into the subroutines to

information

algorithm,
garnishes

to
it

that

build an
with

The function

equation.

data

relationship to A; all

from

record

B,

produce an

centers on

weighted

record A;

according

to

its

the while peeking at record C to note if any

instances of A Cthe concerns to be optimized) will be overlooked.

At the

conclusion of this activity, the machine produces as complete a function
as could be constructed from

the information given.

Again,

example,

focus

and

operation,

the
and

affect/effect
relations.

machine

would

consider
the

The

how

the

objectives,

general

on

conservation

proposals of
and

information

describe
file

from

least

the
cost

the respective policies
this

would

be

in

mathematical

surreptitiously

consulted as a guide in developing the function.

The
derived.

fourth

step

is "merely"

the ma:·:imization of

"Merely" -- what a deceptive little

the e:{pression

descriptor~

-- includes
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primarily the application of the function with respect to the information
in record C, plus all else.
of this step

is the

The significant difficulty in the operation

problem of quantification.

benefits, and maximization to be understood?
exist in any of a number of classes:
secondary,
Sugden).

tangible,

intangible.

How are

the costs,

The costs and the

benefits

real, pecuniary, direct, indirect,

(Campen,

passim,

cf.

Ray,

Sassone,

In the example, the function would be run with the data of the

third set C.

Perhaps it would be discovered that policy X hypothetically

boasts of a high conservation value but is proportionally high in price
Can economic understanding -- as e:·:pected by the establishment of the
parameter in the second step).

Policy Y yields a relatively moderate

advance in conservation at an equal price.

The fifth step returns the results of the analysis to the· operator
"who then somehow corrtbine(s)

the information and analysis received .••

with other considerations in the final process of reaching a decision."
(Campen: 25, emphasis added). Here the legislators review the the product
of the machine, with other considerations.

Perhaps both policies fit the

budget slot available, and the more moderate approach claims adaptability
for more of the different types of problems (e.g., water recreation areas
and road sides as well as forested campgrounds).
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PUBLIC POLICY APPLICATION

The

need

for

cost-benefit analysis with

respect

to government

expenditures is due to the government's not being a profit-oriented firm
and not having a vested interest in reducing costs or seeking economic
efficiency.

Thus, the government tends to emphasize need and disregard

cost CMcf\ean:

12>. To restate, the private firm seeks to ma:dmize net

revenue, profit; whereas the purpose of cost-benefit analysis in public
policy decision-making is to maximize "social benefit" CMishan:

xix). In

economics

possible

there

are

two

curves,

one

representing

all

the

combinations of inputs CKapital, Labor) to produce a certain outcome, one
representing all the possible combinations of inputs at a constant cost.
The

former

Working

is

labelled the

within

primarily

to

income
maximize

isoquant

restraints,
output

at

curve,

the
the

the

private
lowest

latter
firm

the

moves

possible

isocost.
carefully

(fixed)

cost.

Governments, on the other hand, tend to have a job that must be done
(think of a favorite pork-barrel spending item), and cost is "no object."

PROBLEMS IN CONDUCTING A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Given as simple an understanding of cost-benefit analysis as was
outlined

above,

one

can

now

begin

to

examine

the

process

and

assumptions for gaps and problems in the conduct of the technique.
first

attack,

validity,

one

might

question,

for

soundness,

its

For a

feasibility,

and

the descriptive conditions of the "ideal" marketplace.

The
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attack is easily phrased:

can it exist, does it exist, how close can it

be approximated, how does the approximation serve as a starting point for
application,

how should the results of the process be understood with

regard to this fact?

The ambiguity in the value of the separation of decision-maker and
the technician of the cost-benefit analysis provides more questions.
selection, definition, and description of the problem:

The

How much and what

sort of responsibility is on the part of the analyst in this initial
step?

The fallibility of the decision-maker, a lack of clarity in the

communications between the agents could lame the runner on the starting
block.

Conversely, if the technician and the decision-maker were closely

bound,

a possibility for

might result.

conspiracy or a negative union-of-interests

This union would be negative in that it e:{isted at the

expense of the rival, the citizenry or the consuming public.

In the submission of all the relevant information to the "machine"
for the cost-benefit analysis lie problems among the most crucial to the
evaluation of the technique.

The neat little word "all" encompasses much

more that which might at first be listed.
amount

of

information from only a

provoker of questions:

"All" is not an insignificant

few areas.

"Relevant"

is also a

it may not be possible given the contemporary

(with the conduct of the analysis) knowledge of the situation to be able
to predict or even anticipate possible effects or areas of effects of the
decision.

For the process to continue from the information-gathering
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point,

considerations

discounting ovet• time,

of

truth-reflective

calculations

of

price,

the probability or uncertainty involved in the

e:-:pectation of the effects, and the quantification of non-economic or
non-quantifiable costs and benefits in economic terms must be included.

Primary

in

the considerations are,

understanding

of

the objectives.

of

course,

Declaration of

the setting

costs and

and

benefits

requires more than Just indication of the desirable and the undesirable.
The role of the politician operator is to select in the interest of the
constituency,

the

citizenry

in

general,

and

the

world

at

large,

a

hierarchy that is dangerously subject to blindness and bias. Is it beyond
rational

e:<pectations that the local

affected outside of

the group which

Determining costs and benefits is
<McKean:

legislator should look at
is responsible for

~

those

re-election?

than listing "ultimate values"

26). Secondary are lower level priorities which are objects of

"suboptimization• <McKean:

30). In the case of a public policy decision,

the pr imar!;;l objective might be the task to be accompli shed (drug-abuse
education programs in junior high schools), with the secondary concern of
reasonable cost.

1.-,
..:..

CRITICISMS

Cost-benefit analysis is subject to cri ticisrn from many sides.

One

I ine of argument can be drawn from the standard attacks on Bentham-Mi 11
utilitarianism. Consideration of these criticisms sets the stage for others.
Below are outlined some of the arguments against utilitarianism in the terms
of cost-benefit analysis, followed by some responses. The problems that will
be discussed are:
benefits,

bilateral incidence of bias, identification of costs and

measurability,

distribution,

minority rights,

uncertainty,

and

time.

Cost-benefit analysis cannot claim to be purely technical and free of
bias.

Necessarily the perspective of the decision-maker, and possibly the

perspective

of

the

analyst

will

be

evident

in

its

formulation.

The

decision-maker (singular or a collective) e}:presses the objectives of the
course

of

action

under

consideration,

which

are

viewed

from

horizons, which do not encompass exactly the whole of the universe.

limited
In the

case of a legislative agent, this bias could be a favoritism to a region,
constituency, or industry.

Here is encountered the age-old question of the

interest of a politician -- is the legislator able to separate, recognize,
and adopt the interests of the people? What people? Parochialism is possibly
an instance of limitation, yet to whom, to what community is the legislator
responsible?

It does seem absurd that the good Senator should conduct a

study of or sLtbmi t
protectionist

an

policies

apology
(tariffs,

to

the X industry
quotas)

which

in M-land

are

to

be

because of
implemented
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domestically.

Again, the objectives and interests must be prioritized. If

M-land is a critical ally, then perhaps the objective of tranquil relations
ranks higher than the protection of jobs in the good Senator's home State.
Perhaps not, which is example of the issue at hand.

Would a public policy

choice benefitting a regional segment of the population at the cost of an
minimal-but-positive increase in threat to the whole of the population be
wise/ appropriate/ justifiable/ justified?

Clearly

the decision-maker utilizes a

objectives of a course of action
action).

judgement

the

(or an as-yet-to-be-deve 1oped course of

The bias is understood as a given,

safely impervious to criticism.

in determining

but this does not render it

In the political realm, such comments occur

normally in the language of position (e.g., "left," "right,• "conservative,"
•liberal">.
question.

Whether or not these objectives are correct remains an open
Ultimate objectives are not produced de novo; rather,

they are

traditionally described (e.g., in the Constitution) or defined (e.g., in a
party

platform>.

The costs and

benefits of

the

course of action under

consideration are then derived with respect to the stated objective. Because
of the directness of the relationship, the question of whether the "correct"
goods are being measured is seated in the construction of objectives and not
in

the

conduct

of

the

cost-benefit analysis.

The weights accorded

the

respective entities are also drawn from their relation to the objectives.
For e:-:ample,

if the objective is the reduction of fuel dependency, through

the establishment of bicycle lanes, a benefit would be the reduction of fuel
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consumption,

with

the

improvement of

physical

health an achievement en

route, sa to speak.

The second area of
algari thm:

bias

is

in

the analyst's

drawing

up of

the

the degree at relatedness to the decision-maker. Which is the

preferred pasi tian:

detachedness or involvement? If the analyst

detached,

envision

one might

surprises, meaninglessness.
interests" might e:<hibi t

missed/

discounted

connections,

is tao

old news,

If the analyst is tao close, a "conflict of

itself in the shifting of weights of casts and

benefits in order that the desirable result might be produced.

The analyst

needs to have an understanding of the question at hand to make the results
intelligible to the decision-maker.

The positional interpretation of evaluator relativity makes the
truth value at such statements as "this state of affairs is good"
and "X is a better state of affairs than Y" primitively dependent
an the pastian occupied by the person making the statement Car by
the person an whose behalf the statement is made) •.••
Why? Because of the evaluator's involvement in the state at
affairs under consideration.
<Sen: 114,118)

Cast-benefit analysis encounters an obstacle in its operation with the
problem at quantification.

Are the

benefits il.nd costs measurable? The

standard method of accounting, of simply adding gains and subtracting lasses
does nat adequately address the question. As mentioned before, the kinds and
characteristics at benefits and costs do nat always easily lend themselves
to dollar sign assignments.

Those that do often entail other calculations.
-

The improvement of physical health above receives a numerical value from the
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decrease of health benefits insurance companies would pay, for example.

The

effects of a course of action might even remain ungauged and merely be
listed:

"one child per year will die as a result of implementation." The

value of a benefit or a cost is not even consistent to the individual.
Consider the economic principle of diminishing marginal utility.
describes

how

acquisition

utility

of

or

additional

satisfaction
units

of

the

is

increased/

article.

The

This curve

affected
slope

by

the

initially

increases and then reaches some point at which it decreases. The concept was
rather entertainingly illustrated once with the following e:-:ample.
party,

At a.

the first glass of wine imbibed imparts pleasure {+3 utils),

the

second raises the enjoyment more {+4 utils), the third is ok <+2 utils), the
fourth

begins to cause drowsiness

<121 utils).

From this picture,

it

is

evident that the value to the individual of a loss might exceed the value of
a gain {compare the two directions at the point between the second and third
glasses).

The recognized faults of interuti 1 i ty comparison are: that each

individual has a unique marginal utility curve pattern; that the currently
held position {along the curve described by the function) of the individual
cannot be cursorily identified.
understand this?

How should a legislator or decision-maker

How can this be taken into consideration when calculating

costs and benefits?

Again, the best interests of the affected parties must

be considered.

Assumptions must

be made.

One

imagines

that a generalization

is

indulged -- covering a range around the norm of the population distribution.
This

range,

this

norm,

this

distri_bution

will

discount

someone's

16

satisfaction.

Individuals will be over-satiated (possibly to the point of

negative and not Just diminishing marginal utility), others will be less
than satisfied.

These in the minority might be addressed with complementing

policy choices of taxes and subsidies to offset or augment the affects of
the central course of action.

Pareto distribution refers to the choice between two parties.

Let the

benefits be distributed such that one of the individuals (also applicable to
collective entities) believes that her welfare has been increased, let the
other believe that he, too is better off; or, that his welfare is unchanged;
or, that he is worse off.

The first situation is one of Pareto Superiority,

the second of Pareto improvement, the third -- to be announced.
the willingness to pay criterion complicates the computation.
to

the

optimized

amount

an

individual

individual's change in welfare.

would

pay

or

is no longer are all

"WTP" refers

receive

for

the

A hypothetical Pareto situation is created

and labelled "Potential Pareto Improvement Criterion."
question

Introducing

(Campen:

the parties better off or at

29) The

least not

diminished in welfare, but
"by how much does the total sum of money that the gainers from a
project would be prepared to pay to ensure that the project is
undertaken exceed the total sum of money that the losers from a
project would accept as compensation for putting up with it?"
(Sugden Williams: 94)
The additional measures of compensation described above are a part of
the calculations in a deceptive sense.
-- but

they

selected.

do not necessarily

have

They factor into the consideration
to be e:<ecuted

if the project

is

A concern is voiced that the interests of the individuals who
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repeatedly

fall

outside of

the arbitrarily

demarcated

region

might

be

entirely discounted or consistently ignored -- a clear exploitation of the
minority.

The danger is realistic, thanks to the PPIC, that the "redeeming

value" of "good intent" supersedes the ability <need) to make good.

Consequentialist
question

of

approaches

distribution,

for

are

being

also

criticized

naively

for

oblivious

ignoring

to

the

the

present

di str i but ion of goods and perhaps assuming that all the members affected
will be equally served or disserved by the course of action.

Legislators

would not fall victim to this sort of blindness; program choice at this
level

take

calculations.

into

account

the

current

distribution

in

part

of

the

In an ideal Paretian fashion, it is expected that legislators

would seek to maintain the status quo or to contribute to a more equitable
distribution.

The danger (and possibly "necessary evil"?) of the Potential

Pareto Improvement Criterion is that it would allow the legislator to rest
easily with whatever had been wrought in the comforting knowledge that the
short-changed segment of the population could receive its proper allocation
of benefits, but it there is no requirement that they should.

In

dealing

with

any

expected outcome effects,

subject to the caprices of the future.
neatly, safely predictable.

the

solutions

are

Very 1 i ttle in this universe is

We make our best guesses, and that is all they

are. The problem of unpredictability has several aspects: (1) that the known
elements wi 11

not

interact as e:<pected

(2)

outcome which

is e:<pected will not occur (3)

to produce

<such)

that

as expected (i.e.,

the

with a

---------------------------~-------------------------
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significant!~

different

1 imi ted efficacy.

intensity).

Probabilit~

is

incorporated,

A completely une:{pected unanticipated event of untold

proportion and far-reaching repercussions could occur
chosen

project's

with

operations

are

inaugurated

and

the day after the

render

the

careful

measurements, calculations, and predictions invalid.

Evaluations of costs and benefits includes the factors of probability
and time.

Time refers to when the effects are e:{pected to be experienced.

Distant effects are reduced by means of the standard financial device of the
present value formula.
asset

The formula takes the expected future value of the

(denominated in money terms) and pulls it forward,

discounting the

value over the "lapsed" time period using a "discount rate• derived from the
interest rate or real rate of return.

A sibling calculation enables the

comparison of a present good with another at a specifed point in the future.

A separate line of criticism is taken from elementary macroeconomics.
Governmental

fiscal

policy

is

effective

or

not,

depending

on

one's

description <Keynsian or neoclassical or ---> of the relevant curves.

The

problerr, of the "crowding out• effect refers to either the action of the
government in the place of private interest actions (social security where
there was private charity), or the usage of financial capital on the part of
the government in competition with private interest funding. This could be a
hidden cost not included in the calculations.
such

government

activity

An additional concern is the

possibility

that

would

procycl ical,

alleviating or aggravating the current

be

countercyclical
(or future>

or

economic
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conditions. The problem is not fatal to the undertaking of projects; rather,
it should be included as an area of incidence for costs and benefits.

2(2)

RESPONSE

In response to the criticism that cost-benefit analysis cannot
claim

to

be

purely

technical

and

free

of

bias,

"realistically" at the world in which it exists.
taken

from

a

perspective,

every

perspective

one

must

look

A view of anything is
is

incomplete,

somehow

limited. Decisions must be made, and in some reasonable space of time to
retain their desired efficacy.

Necessarily then,

in the "real world,"

there will be a lacuna in the perfect information, and the show will go
on.

As regards

recognized:

the

bias of

the

analyst,

the

danger

of

abuse

is

the classic line runs (addressing the economist>, "what's

two plus two?" and the reply, "what would you like it to be?"
two reasons for error in the conduct of cost-benefit analysis:

There are
that of

ordinary mistakes the calculations, and that of actual faults in the
whole undertaking. All decision-making apparati are susceptible to those
with intent to deceive.

The correct identification of what are the costs and benefits has
been called an art.

It is hoped that in a democratic system there would

be various information inputs so as to construct

a

best approximation of

what is to be sought or augmented (positive, benefits> and what is to be
avoided or diminished (negative, costs>.

The

issue

of

minority

cost-benefit analysis itself.

rights

does

remain

unaddressed

by

It is hoped that other measures will be
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taken, that the excuse of Potential <Pareto) Improvement will not shield
the decision-making authorities from their responsibility to the whole
and not merely the larger

(more vocal,

avenue

to

might

be attention

the

etc.).

A possible

concern of

distributive

powerful,

societal

justice.

The problem of uncertainty is in part accepted as a realistic
information

lack.

The multi tude,

it has been observed,

tend to be

present-oriented. Market prices may not be ideal for there is no perfect
competition which acts to set them,

but they are representative of a

recognized value, and are therefore of significance in calculations.

Quantification is a controversial point, but it serves in context.
Utilizing a common denominator <e.g.,
simplification of variables.

dollars> enables comparison and

Not everything can be converted, but what

cannot is listed for the decision-maker to take into consideration.

The concern of government crowding-out effects can be anticipated,
perhaps, by a knowledge of the condition of the economy.
lags in execution.

There will be

Some economic theorists hold that government policy

actions will· have no effect, due to compensatory activity in the private
sector.

Cost-benefit analysis reduces the variables in a question, making
the decision more clear.

It is a means of consolidating information so
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as

to

make

the

information

more

manageable.

It

is

thought

that

utilization of cost-benefit analysis is an improvement over the "square
one" image of a listing of all the factors that are to be considered in
the decision.

That first picture is more highly prone to all of the

weaknesses cited against cost-benefit analysis, but to a (perniciously)
worse degree.
agent;

rather,

It

does not advertise itself as a political
it

is

decision-making agents.

a

technique

to

be

used

or moral

responsibly

by
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In

Samuel

<Clarendon,

Scheffler's

1984),

The

Rejection

around,

He extends his suggestion as to

what sorts of plausibi 1 i ties

failings.

Consequential ism

cannot be too far off in which we hear no more

da~

Scheffler's next paragraph opens with "and

come ••• "pp3,4.

of

he quotes Bernard Williams in criticism of classical

utilitarianism, that "the
of it."

book

Recall the Biblical

it

~et

the

da~

refuses to

utilitarianism is still

wh~

holds which compensate tor

its

of Gamaliel <Acts 5:34-9) who is asked

star~

to do something about those new Christian folks.

He sagely replies that he

will do nothing: if the new church is of human construction, it will fall of
its inherent imperfections; it of the design of God,
eternally

an~

attacks.

Perhaps there is too great a liberty taken in this

metaphorical extension, but thoughts are provoked.
utilitarianism

are

then it wi 11 resist

extrapolated,

so

too

can

As the criticisms of of
the

rebuttals

of

those

criticisms serve in support of cost-benefit analysis.

A good question

to ask after

the criticisms

listed above

is

(in

classic reductio ad absurdum), "suppose these difficulties find cost-benefit
analysis

unfit

to

carry

any

freight

then

what?"

What

sorts

of

alternatives are available, feasible, viable? A venture would be to say "not
much of anything."
there

could be a

In good tyrannical style, in place of public agencies,
dictator

who chooses courses of action with

interest patently at the center.
famil~

his own

Easily in mind the example of the Somoza

which helped the donations for the recovery from the 1975 earthquake

in Nicaragua find their way into the vacation fund .•••

-

----

-

- - -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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It is of interest to note that the passerby, without the Ph. D.

in

environmental science or whatever, upon learning ot two policy proposals
would "rationally" select the one that weighed out the best, that produced
the most

tor

the money and energy

considerations."

invested;

without

Part of the advocation of a

drawing on

"other

process as e:·:haust i ve as

cost-benefit analysis is due to the danger ot error in first

impression

decisions made in ignorance.

Emily

Dickinson

recognized

how

"much

madness"

(as

judged

by

the

general public) could make "divinest sense" -- if the eye that perceived was
a discerning one.
additional

In support of cost-benefit analysis is the hope that the

apprehension

of

the

problem and

its situation

discerning eye would be to the greater benefit of the general
society that contained it.
more crippling
here.

by

the more

p~blic

and the

That discerning eye could overcome some of the

criticisms and

limitations brought forward and

discussed
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